For The News on Sunday

Only a democratic dispensation that enjoys people’s mandate will be able to handle the disastrous energy crisis, the spillover of Nato’s exit from Afghanistan and the security and foreign policies

Pakistan’s first rule-based democratic transition is underway. The last time a civilian government oversaw the election process was in 1977 when charges of rigging led to a popular movement, ouster of the civilian government and ultimately a coup. Otherwise it has been one military or quasi-military regime managing the process of elections.

Three institutions are managing this process: Firstly, the Election Commission of Pakistan; secondly, the Judiciary and thirdly the interim governments in centre and the provinces. The role of the president is minimal other than his own party affairs and the military seems to be in the background and largely focusing on the security issues. This is a situation, which ought to be celebrated as we have the basic preconditions in order.

But state incapacity and ideological biases overshadow the ongoing transition. In the past few weeks, the returning offices — senior district judicial officers — have been scrutinizing the candidates in a most ad hoc manner. In their zeal to abide by the constitutional clauses inserted by Gen Zia’s regime — which place a premium on the faith of the candidate and his/her loyalty to an undefined ‘ideology of Pakistan’ — a circus was witnessed.

An unprofessional line of questioning adopted by the ROs marred the initial electoral proceedings. The ECP perhaps did not issue the right standard guidelines and, therefore, left the subordinate judges to exercise their will and the results were not too pleasing. Women were asked how would they manage their children if they became a legislator and others were asked to recite Quranic verses with the right intonations and accent! Ideological shifts of the past three decades were at work here.

(more…)

Holding a peaceful election in 2013 would, perhaps, be one of the important milestones in countering the power and influence of the extremists

Within two months, nearly 90 million Pakistanis will vote to elect new federal and provincial governments. This democratic transition has been hailed as a major victory of Pakistan’s fledgling democracy beset by regional instability and a worsening domestic security climate.

During the first quarter of 2013, 35 of sectarian attacks have taken place in Karachi and Quetta. In the same period, at least 144 suicide bombings and attacks on state installations have taken place in various parts of the country. Given this unfortunate situation, there is a widespread fear that the forthcoming elections may entail unprecedented violence and god forbid high profile assassinations.

However, “violence” needs to be unpacked and examined in the context of Pakistani politics. There are three strands of violence which are independently and sometimes jointly working to create a semi-anarchic situation where citizens and political parties are insecure, the state seems to be on the retreat and the militant groups appear to be in the ascendant.

First, we are gripped by the larger, unholy alliance between al-Qaeda, the Taliban, especially the Pakistani factions, and the sectarian outfits such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), bolstered by other banned terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) etc. Details of these groups and the specific nature of their activities are all too well known and recorded by both Pakistani and foreign analysts. There is a strange paradox at work here. The state is under attack by these groups and at the same time, it is trying to explore the options of negotiating with these groups for some kind of a truce. The backdrop, of course, is the post-Nato situation in Afghanistan where Pakistan is keen to book a seat on the Afghan power table.

This strand of violence is affecting much of Fata (at least four agencies are battlegrounds between the Pakistan army and the militants), and Khyber Paktunkhawa province. The TTP has issued most brazen statements such as the one which urges people to stay away from the public rallies of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Awami National Party (ANP). The space for these relatively progressive and moderate parties is, therefore, shrinking with each passing day.

For instance, the ANP is likely to hold no rallies and only go for door-to-door campaigning. Its leadership has been advised by the party not to be physically present during the electoral campaign. The PPP chairperson, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, is not in the country, and while speculation on his departure has been reported in the press, however, the actual situation is not being deliberated which relates to the simple fact that Bilawal Bhutto is not secure in Pakistan given the fact that his mother Benazir Bhutto was killed five years ago after an election rally in Rawalpindi. (more…)

My piece on the elections for The News on Sunday

Holding a peaceful election in 2013 would, perhaps, be one of the important milestones in countering the power and
influence of the extremists

Within two months, nearly 90 million Pakistanis will vote to elect new federal and provincial governments. This democratic transition has been hailed as a major victory of Pakistan’s fledgling democracy beset by regional instability and a worsening domestic security climate.

During the first quarter of 2013, 35 of sectarian attacks have taken place in Karachi and Quetta. In the same period, at least 144 suicide bombings and attacks on state installations have taken place in various parts of the country. Given this unfortunate situation, there is a widespread fear that the forthcoming elections may entail unprecedented violence and god forbid high profile assassinations.

However, “violence” needs to be unpacked and examined in the context of Pakistani politics. There are three strands of violence which are independently and sometimes jointly working to create a semi-anarchic situation where citizens and political parties are insecure, the state seems to be on the retreat and the militant groups appear to be in the ascendant.

First, we are gripped by the larger, unholy alliance between al-Qaeda, the Taliban, especially the Pakistani factions, and the sectarian outfits such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), bolstered by other banned terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) etc. Details of these groups and the specific nature of their activities are all too well known and recorded by both Pakistani and foreign analysts. There is a strange paradox at work here. The state is under attack by these groups and at the same time, it is trying to explore the options of negotiating with these groups for some kind of a truce. The backdrop, of course, is the post-Nato situation in Afghanistan where Pakistan is keen to book a seat on the Afghan power table.

(more…)

My piece published here

Pakistan’s next general election, due in a few months, will be the first where civilian forces are in charge of the transition from one elected government to another. Throughout its history, Pakistan’s military and civil bureaucracy have been the arbiters of political transitions.

With the elections nearing, the political leadership of Pakistan faces many questions about not only the interim government that will oversee the polls, but also the rules of the game for those contesting elections.

While Pakistan’s noisy and multifarious media is highlighting various election issues, on most occasions the intent behind the programming is to sensatationalise matters. It is critical to inform the public about these issues and build sufficient pressure on institutions to take steps wherever necessary to ensure free, fair and transparent elections.

There are seven main challenges before the political parties, especially those leading the coalition government and the opposition. The sooner these are dealt with, the more likely that the coming elections will make history. (more…)

Dr Tahirul Qadri, who has kept Pakistani pundits busy for the past three months, faced a major blow when a three-member SC bench dismissed his petition (which stated that the Chief Election Commissioner and four members of the ECP were not appointed in accordance with the Articles 213, 218of the Pakistani Constitution).

The court decreed that it failed to point out any violations of fundamental rights in either the petition itself, or the arguments by the petitioner. Therefore, as per 184 (3) of the Constitution, none of Qadri’s fundamental rights were infringed upon. Throughout the hearing of this case certain faultlines were traversed by both the parties. The court reminded Qadri that he was a dual national and his loyalties were split. Qadri in his retort reminded the Chief Justice of his past allegiance to Gen Musharraf during the days before March 2007 when Musharraf was resisted by the judges.

The Supreme Court observed that dual nationals were allowed to vote in Pakistani elections. But the court added that because of his dual nationality, Dr Qadri could not contest elections under Article 63(1) of the Constitution. Qadri’s dual nationality was, however, constantly brought under question during the proceedings.

In another case which made headlines during 2011 and 2012, the court gave extraordinary attention to US citizen Mansoor Ijaz’s testimony and also entertained a petition filed by a Canadian citizen on the alleged violation of Pakistan’s national security by the civilian government through it Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani.

A commission was formed to investigate the charges in the so-called memogate. The findings of the Memo Commission sadly relied mostly on the testimony of Mansoor Ijaz, who was exempted from appearing personally and could not be considered a reliable and honest witness. The formation of a commission instead of registering a police case led to the exemption of Mansoor Ijaz’s presence before the court. It should be noted that the judicial commission allowed Mansoor Ijaz’s testimony to be delivered via video conferencing, but denied Haqqani the same facility. (more…)

Something I wrote for The News on Sunday

If Dr Tahirul Qadri is controversial for his loyalty as a dual national, then Mansoor Ijaz as a US citizen must not be given a high place in the ‘Memo case’

Dr Tahirul Qadri, who has kept Pakistani pundits busy for the past three months, faced a major blow when a three-member SC bench dismissed his petition (which stated that the Chief Election Commissioner and four members of the ECP were not appointed in accordance with the Articles 213, 218of the Pakistani Constitution).

The court decreed that it failed to point out any violations of fundamental rights in either the petition itself, or the arguments by the petitioner. Therefore, as per 184 (3) of the Constitution, none of Qadri’s fundamental rights were infringed upon. Throughout the hearing of this case certain faultlines were traversed by both the parties. The court reminded Qadri that he was a dual national and his loyalties were split. Qadri in his retort reminded the Chief Justice of his past allegiance to Gen Musharraf during the days before March 2007 when Musharraf was resisted by the judges.

The Supreme Court observed that dual nationals were allowed to vote in Pakistani elections. But the court added that because of his dual nationality, Dr Qadri could not contest elections under Article 63(1) of the Constitution. Qadri’s dual nationality was, however, constantly brought under question during the proceedings.

In another case which made headlines during 2011 and 2012, the court gave extraordinary attention to US citizen Mansoor Ijaz’s testimony and also entertained a petition filed by a Canadian citizen on the alleged violation of Pakistan’s national security by the civilian government through it Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani.

(more…)

On peace with India for The News on Sunday

After the recent LoC fiasco, there has to be long-term commitment and readiness to install shock absorbing measures as the trust grows gradually and not without dangerous chances of reversal

The recent escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan comes after an uninterrupted peace process for two years during which both the countries made a substantial progress in burying the hatchet and moving on. For many cynics, hawks, and naysayers on both sides, events of 2012 were alarming. Beyond the regular continuation of high-level parleys, three concrete achievements were made in the bilateral relations.

First, the hardline position on terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir dispute by India and Pakistan was pushed and amended to achieve an atmosphere conducive to dialogue. India showed flexibility on its rigid position on the ghastly Mumbai attacks of 2008; and Pakistan showed maturity in admitting Pakistani citizens had crossed into India and were part of the larger plan to cause mayhem in Mumbai. More importantly, the festering dispute of Jammu and Kashmir was relegated to one of the more difficult issues to be dealt in the future.

Secondly, Pakistan did the unthinkable by announcing it would grant the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India for the purposes of trade. Satisfactory progress on this front also took place during 2012 and the trade liberalisation is already underway generating more and more stakes into the peace process.

Third, the visa accord signed between India and Pakistan changed the cold war culture created by both the states since 1965. In particular, visa liberalisation for businessman, setting up of banks in both the countries and allowing investments was a historic landmark.

(more…)

Here’s what I wrote for The News on Sunday about the Pakistan Army’s revised security and threat assessment

The Pakistan army has reportedly revised its security assessment and is now placing more emphasis on ‘internal threats’ rather than the external enemies

Media reports suggest that the Pakistan army has revised its security assessment and is now placing more emphasis on ‘internal threats rather than the external enemies which have informed its strategy as well as operations. This is a welcome development. The details of its new doctrine are unclear but there have been three indications in the recent past. First, the tacit support to the civilian government’s thaw with India and undertaking the unimaginable: trade with India. Second, the chief of the army staff, Gen Kayani, while speaking at an official ceremony, cited the threat of extremism and reiterated the moderate ethos of Islam. Thirdly, the continued battle against militants in the northwest of the country continues without any major policy reversal.

There are two issues with the internal shifts, if any, with the way military is proceeding with its strategic rethink. First of all, due to its structure and institutional culture it is not an open and engaging entity. Decisions are centralised and are taken by a coterie of top commanders. Secondly it is also learning to readjust its power and influence within the context of a changing Pakistan.

After five years of civilian rule and emergence of new power centres (judiciary and media), its exclusive monopoly of power had been eroded. For instance, launching a coup though not impossible is a far more complicated endeavour. In this fluid political environment, the Army has yet to find a comfortable equilibrium with the political forces and the parliament. It might have been more useful had the army tried to engage with the national security committee of the parliament thereby giving its rethink more depth, public input and long term legitimacy.

(more…)

Media reports suggest that the Pakistan army has revised its security assessment and is now placing more emphasis on ‘internal threats’ rather than the external enemies which had informed its strategy as well as operations. This is a welcome development. The details of the new doctrine are unclear but there have been three indications in the recent past. First, the tacit support to the civilian government’s thaw with India and undertaking the unimaginable: trade with India. Second, the chief of the army staff, Gen Kayani, while speaking at an official ceremony on August 14, cited the threat of extremism and reiterated the moderate ethos of Islam. Thirdly, the continued battle against militants in the northwest of the country continues without any major policy reversal.

There are two issues with the internal shifts, if any, in the way military is proceeding with its strategic rethink. First of all, due to its structure and institutional culture it is not an open and engaging entity. Decisions are centralised and are taken by a coterie of top commanders. Secondly it is also learning to readjust its power and influence within the context of a changing Pakistan.

Secondly, after five years of civilian rule and emergence of new power centres (judiciary and media), its exclusive monopoly of power had been eroded. For instance, launching a coup though not impossible is a far more complicated endeavour. In this fluid political environment, the Army has yet to find a comfortable equilibrium with the political forces and the parliament. It might have been more useful had the army tried to engage with the national security committee of the parliament thereby giving its rethink more depth, public input and long term legitimacy.

Let’s not forget that the ideological propaganda of al Qaeda and its affiliates has penetrated various sections of the Pakistani society. Whilst the Pakistani population does not want a Taliban type regime that bans women’s education, a vast majority of the population considers the US as an enemy of Islam and the Muslim. More often than not the West — as a vague construct — is also employed in this xenophobic and violent ideology of resistance. This narrative has gained ground in the country whether we like or not.

Sadly the elements of the state, especially the military, have added to this paranoia by firstly allowing the torchbearers of this ideology to live safely in the country for over a decade and secondly to operate from within the country. In this lax environment, the al Qaeda and its junior partner, the Taliban, have made some local alliances (more…)

The death of nine anti-Polio workers has come as a new low in the life of the Pakistani nation. Almost as if the country had lost its bearings and its society could not even determine its priorities. The Polio virus is a real threat to the future of Pakistani children and adults. While it has been eliminated in the neighbouring countries such as India and Bangladesh, Pakistan has witnessed the resurgence of the virus as well as a disturbing trend of refusals among the parents to vaccinate children. There is a complex set of factors at play. The extremists have unleashed a campaign, which considers the Polio vaccine as part of the ‘Western’ agenda to harm the Muslims of Pakistan. Last year’s CIA-sponsored fake vaccination campaigns to hunt bin Laden did not help this cause either. Polio vaccination was made controversial in the process. But all of this is not an excuse to deny Pakistani children their right to a safe and healthy future.

The United Nations is now worried about the security of its staff and the growing threats to their workers and volunteers who are undertaking door-to-door campaigns to achieve one hundred percent vaccination coverage of all children. The World Health Organisation, as reported in the media, might be winding up its work in the country. This is a moment of reckoning for the Pakistani authorities – its civilian government and the army leadership – which have to ensure that this country does not become hostage to the terror perpetrated by the extremists who have a warped view of the world.

The brutal killing of five people in Karachi and more in Peshawar and Nowshehra is a sad reminder of our crippled law enforcement machinery. The Police remains governed by a confusing legal and administrative arrangement. Whatever reform was initiated under Musharraf has been undone by the civilian governments in the provinces, which are keen to use the Police as an instrument of personal and political aggrandizement. The prosecution services are in shambles and no worthwhile investment has been made into them despite the massive threat of terrorism and worsening law and order across the country.

How can the courts decide on terrorism cases if there is unreliable and incomplete investigation and prosecution of a particular criminal case? Having said that the courts especially at the district level have not demonstrated much efficiency in deciding on terrorism cases. Sometimes they are afraid and on other occasions they face cases, which have little credible evidence for a sentence to be made. (more…)

Media freedoms in Pakistan are no longer a cause of celebration. Recent events have shown that journalists are facing pressure from all sides. Historically, it was the state power, especially that of the executive which curbed freedom of speech and attacked journalists. We have entered a new phase of struggle today when power is being dispersed and, hence, journalists are under attack by non-state actors. Dozens of Pakistani journalists have died in recent years and several face threats and intimidation from the militants and mafias in the country.
Last year, Saleem Shahzad was brutally murdered and to date we don’t know if there was a killer or some invisible hand that killed the journalist. Similarly, a young reporter Wali Baber died in Karachi and such is the might of his killers that all witnesses in his case have been murdered. Senior journalist and popular TV anchor Najam Sethi is under threat and recently two TV anchors, i.e, Hamid Mir and Mohammad Malick were intimidated. In the FATA region and parts of Khyber Pakhtankhwa and Balochistan provinces insurgents and militants kill or attack reporters with impunity.
This is a major challenge to Pakistan’s fragile democracy. Press freedom and right to information are non-negotiable rights central to the idea of a democracy. Sadly, the government and the failed criminal justice system have not come to the rescue to the victims. The powerful intelligence agencies, urban gangs and militants have inroads into the ‘system’, thereby impeding any form of justice. Little wonder that Pakistan is turning into a violent country and adapting to the widespread denial of justice.
Other than the physical threats, the pressures on the media are tremendous. For decades, the army did not allow any criticism and it had made foolproof arrangements to control the narrative and promote a particular version of ‘truth’ and ‘ history’. Even civilian governments were not too different when it came to attacking freedom. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later Mohammad Nawaz Sharif as powerful Prime Ministers were keen to control the media. While the journalists showed resilience, the media houses also learnt the art of playing politics and by the end of Musharraf’s rule the media owners as a small group emerged as a major power centre. (more…)

My piece published on 10th Moharram

It is time the state reversed its policy of nurturing extremist groups and think of saving Pakistanis from further mayhem

Only a meaningful civil service reforms can improve  the state capacity to perform better

By Raza Rumi

Pakistan’s inability to provide security and justice to its citizens; and deliver basic services is a common theme in our political discourse. Political parties, which are in power, make tall claims of doing this and that but in effect their reliance on a state apparatus which is unable to deliver is a known reality. During the last four years, other than taking very cosmetic steps the way our executive branch of the state is organised has remained unchanged.

Whereas a beginning has been made to shift the power from centre to provinces, the provincial administrations continue to work according to structures that were established nearly 160 years ago. Much has been said and written about a long pending civil service reform but nothing has been achieved except the partial reform in the 1970s.

Pakistan is a populous country now and its problems have grown manifold in the past few decades. Yet the inability of the state to respond to the challenges is spectacular. Also, the word ‘reform’ is a joke now for every time it is mentioned the transformationists make fun of it and the agents of the status quo start citing the failed experiments of the past.

What impedes reform then? Working on various projects with federal and provincial government departments and agencies teaches you that structures are overwhelming when it comes to arguing for even minor changes. (more…)

What is the real, existential cause for
concern — the imagined enemy, or a real, functional terror network in the shape of the TTP?

Published in The News, October 2012

The renewed attacks of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) across the country indicate the exasperation of this anti-state network trying to re-assert its strength in the face of Pakistan Army’s operations as well as the drone strikes by the U.S., which have now turned into a major political plank for most political parties.

The illegal drone strikes have targeted Al Qaeda leadership as well as the TTP stalwarts, leading to the dispersal of militants’ leadership and the relocation of Al Qaeda, reportedly to several urban centers of Pakistan.

The ‘popular’ Imran Khan led his march to Waziristan (without being able to set foot in the tribal agency) and created a kind-of media consensus that Pakistan needed to pull out of “America’s war” and make peace with the Taliban or, more fantastically, enable the threatened tribals to take on the Taliban themselves.

This fanciful and simplistic narrative omitted a vital segment of reality: the TTP is pitted not just against the United States’ “imperial designs” — it also considers the state of Pakistan as its enemy. These Kharijites of the 21st century use religious appeal to justify and rationalise extremely violent and barbaric acts, and consider the existence of pluralism within the fold of Islam as an anathema. They consider women’s education to be un-Islamic and consider a constitutional democracy as an infidel imposition on the faithful.

Unlike other insurgent groups in Pakistan, TTP wants to demolish the state of Pakistan and its constitutional basis in line with Al Qaeda ideology. Readers doubtful of this polemic should refer to Al Zawahiri’s famous treatise called “The Morning And The Lamp”, freely available on the Internet. If they are further interested, they could refer to any bookshop where such materials are widely available. This is how we have allowed anti-state doctrines to penetrate our public life.

The most brazen act of targeting a 14-year old girl, Malala Yousafzai, immediately after Khan’s march came as a game-changer. The “public opinion” shaped by Taliban apologists faced the biggest jolt, the biggest after Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in 2007. Even the conservative and religious sections of Pakistani society could not help condemn this barbarity, and for a day or two, it appeared as if there was a major consensus emerging in the country that put homegrown terrorist networks such as TTP before the imagined enemies such as India or the United States.

However, this consensus was breached by the usual suspects such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, which termed the Taliban as their brothers, obfuscating the real issue of a girl child not being allowed to go to school. The JI also went ahead and, on various social media platforms, released pictures of Malala and her father meeting the late Richard Holbrooke, thereby suggesting that Malala’s family were CIA agents and “legitimate targets” of the TTP. This came as a shocking reminder to the country on the lack of clarity and deliberate confusion spread by the apologists for brutal groups such as the Taliban. (more…)

My piece published today in TNS

The joke is that those who raise the slogan of Islam in the loudest voices have nothing to do with the philosophy of this religion… Apart from imperialism, no mention is ever made of Islam’s great humanism, nor is it considered necessary to speak about the open-heartedness of Arab seers, Iranian poets and Indian Sufis. There is no interest in the philosophy of Ali and Hussain. Islam is being presented as a violent religion and a violent way of life.” (Qurratulain Hyder, Aag Ka Darya, 1957)

On August 16, 2012, passenger buses headed towards Gilgit-Baltistan via the Mansehra-Naran-Jalkhad route were stopped by killers dressed in military uniforms, who undertook a witch hunt of Shia Muslims by putting them through a theological test. Later, the terrorists killed 21 Shias and 3 Sunnis who tried to protect the former. This was the second such incident on the highway — in February 2012, 19 Shias were murdered in broad daylight. Only this year, there have been dozens of attacks on the Shia population in Pakistan, and hundreds have been killed.

More recently, the Gilglit Baltistan and Balochistan have emerged as the hot spots for Shia hatred and killings. These are zones where governance is weak and new havens are being established for Sunni militant organisations that can launder the Taliban and Al Qaeda agenda of destabilising the country and cleansing it of non-Wahabi-Salafi influence.

The expansion of sectarian hatred has emerged as a major threat to peace and harmony in Pakistan. The denominational differences in Islam are not new. They have been there since the new faith spread from the seventh century onwards. Sects of Islam have always reinforced the pluralism of this faith and its ability to absorb myriad cultural nuances. From the spartan interpretations of the faith in the Arabian Peninsula to the eclectic Central Asian and Persian cultures, the core principles of Islam – equality, redistributive justice and focus on spirituality – have attracted a variety of groups and communities.

In South Asia, Islam arrived through the Sufis who were multicultural by birth and attitude. Sufis had their sectarian origins but they placed emphasis on the inherent cultural diversity of the subcontinent; instead of being exclusivist, they attempted to be as inclusive as possible. Most Sufi orders established in medieval India respected local traditions, folklore, languages and age-old belief systems. This is how the peculiar framework of a tolerant, secular local society emerged in South Asia. As court-based Ulema gained power and influence, there were communitarian and sectarian tensions, which usually come with the organised clergy.

The Shia and Sunni clerics opposed each other but kept the debates intellectual and theological. Manazara (a theological debate) was a popular instrument in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It would shock many Pakistanis to know that even Ahmadis (also termed pejoratively Qadianis) held manazaras with Sunni clerics and no one brandished each other as infidel or called for ‘cleansing’. (more…)