“We cannot have an army or intelligence agencies that constantly destabilise governments. We cannot have rogue elements incessantly violating their oath and plunging the nation into crises — Benazir Bhutto (Herald, 2000)

Evidently, the state of Pakistan is rotten when its former Chief of the Army Staff, who does not stop touting himself as a true patriot, prima facie, violated the constitutional oath he undertook. It is not just Mirza Aslam Beg whose nefarious involvement in politics has been the subject of discussion in the courts and TV channels but countless others in Pakistan who have been upto similar transgressions and getting away with them.

After the death of Gen Ziaul Haq in 1988, military rule only changed its clothes. It survived and flourished for a decade until the Emperor threw off his civilian façade and took over in 1999 through a proper coup d’etat citing the same old excuse of saving the country. The history of 1988-1999 is yet to be written for it has remained hostage to the obfuscations of a political class created by the army itself and its loyalist intellectuals who rule the media and are found in Pakistan’s moribund academia as well.

The recent political glasnost in Pakistan — thanks to the lawyers’ mobilisation and the refusal of two major political parties to repeat their mistakes — is a new chapter in our history. Whether this is an illusion or a temporary triumphant moment, remains to be seen. The Supreme Court has, after a criminal delay of sixteen years taken up the Asghar Khan petition. The ‘free’ and independent Supreme Court did not take up this pending case until there was sufficient public pressure in the recent months. The judges have been remarking that they are representing ‘people’s will’ and perhaps this is why they are now establishing that they are truly independent and not taking cues from their erstwhile senior partner the military-intelligence complex. This is a welcome development and, if taken to its logical conclusion, might reset the way power dynamics have been structured in Pakistan.

After 1988 elections, it was clear that the junta, despite losing its greatest Machiavellian leader, Zia, was in no mood to transfer power to a civilian government. The story of Benazir Bhutto’s first ill-fated government (1988-1990) has been well documented by her advisor Iqbal Akhund in his book entitled, Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto (OUP Pakistan, 2000). The book, among other things, reveals the severe limits of Bhutto’s powers and outlines how she had little control over core governance areas such as security and economic policies.

During this time, there were two serious attempts to oust her: first, through a vote of no-confidence where the rogue intelligence officials doled out money to engineer the outcomes. The name of one Osama Bin laden was also cited as a potential financier of this effort. Bhutto’s government also indulged in horse trading given that was the ‘set’ game in town. In a hard-hitting interview given to monthly Herald (in 2000), Bhutto recounts the years in these words:

“..in December 1988, within a week of my forming the government, Brigadier Imtiaz, working at the ISI Internal, began contacting political parties to overthrow my government. My political adviser at the time, General Babar, moved to have him replaced. The army refused initially, though later, Brigadier Imtiaz was removed from the ISI Internal, not from the army itself…We collected proof, in 1989, of ISI elements visiting MNAs for a no-confidence move. We made audio tapes. The head of the MI entered my office and saw the photograph of the man who had been approaching my MNAs. He panicked, took the photograph and the tape and then sent me a report saying the man in question was deranged. In 1990, when the ISI launched a similar effort, we made a videotape called Operation Jackal. A serving army officer, Brigadier Imtiaz, technically not in the ISI but substantively still there, was taped saying: ‘the army does not want her, the president does not want her, the Americans don’t want her’. He was seeking the support of parliamentarians to oust the government. I gave that tape, substantive proof of treason, to General Beg. He filibustered.” (more…)

Ali Dayan Hasan, Pakistan Director, Human Rights Watch, was one of the few people who recently gave testimony to US Congress on the issue of Balochsitan province. I interviewed him for The News on Sunday.

Can you outline your testimony to the US Congress on Balochistan?

Ali Dayan Hasan: The hearing provided an opportunity to highlight the dire human rights situation in Balochistan and was used by HRW to that end. We take no position on the issue of self-determination and I clarified that Balochistan was an internationally recognised Pakistani province and not a territory over which there was any dispute over sovereignty. That said, HRW expects Pakistan’s constitutional protections for citizens to apply to those who live in the province. I explained that while the state — through the army, intelligence agencies and paramilitaries such as the FC — was the principal abusive actor, Balochistan presented a complex situation with multiple actors involved in human rights abuse.

While the state is responsible for illegal detentions, disappearances and targeted killings, it is also true that Baloch nationalists have targeted non-Baloch settlers and Sunni extremists are killing Shias in the province. HRW also called upon Congress to examine US complicity with former military ruler Pervez Musharraf in the disappearances of al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects, and how that enabled Musharraf to extend enforced disappearances to the menu of human rights abuses across Pakistan generally and in Balochistan in particular. I also explained that Balochistan was not a mono-ethnic province peopled only by the Baloch but that they comprised just over half the population and that any examination of the place of Baloch nationalism had to factor in the implications stemming from this reality.

Were you surprised at the outrage over the Congressional hearing in Pakistan? Do you think it was justified?

ADH: I made clear even before the hearing that HRW was only using the hearing as a platform to highlight the human rights situation in Balochistan and we viewed the politics surrounding the hearing in the US with discomfort. However, on balance, international groups such as HRW and Amnesty felt it important that an objective human rights analysis, based in international law rather than political rhetoric, be placed on the record. While I understand why Congressman Rohrabacher’s resolution asking for self-determination in Balochistan was negatively received in Pakistan, I have said before and I repeat that it is not within Rohrabacher’s or the US Congress’s capacity to create or dismember countries. Every sane minded person understands this both in the US and Pakistan. But these events have focused attention within Pakistan on the human rights crisis in Balochistan and that is a positive development. And now, knowing that it is on the international radar, it is incumbent upon Pakistan’s political and military leaders to end an untenable policy of denial and resolve this crisis speedily and meaningfully.  (more…)

There seems to be a serious dearth of imagination while searching for solutions on Balochistan

As Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy recently wrote, “Men like Rohrabacher are no friends of the Baloch. But what can stop their meddling? The answer can only come once we dump the myth of Pakistan being one nation, one people”. The continuous undermining of Pakistan’s pluralism, citizenship rights and quest for self-rule has led to a situation where Pakistani flag is not welcome in many parts of its largest and most neglected province.

This is not the first time that the country has faced a dire situation. In 1971, we were faced with a similar dilemma and the civil-military elites of West Pakistan bungled. Their mishandling was exacerbated by an external intervention and for years we have been fed with stories of how all was hunky dory in the more populous wing of Pakistan until the evil ‘Hindu’ India destroyed the ‘Muslim’ Pakistan.

It takes a questionable resolution tabled in the US Congress by Dana Rohrabacher, an extremist republican with a dubious past, to alarm the mainstream Pakistani politicians and media about the plight of Baloch people. Yet again, a “conspiracy” to disintegrate the land of the pure has been reiterated. The good part is that Balochistan issue — something that the media was afraid to talk about — has become a subject of prime-time, and sometimes ill-informed, discussions on national television.

We cannot absolve ourselves of the decades-long discrimination that the province and its people have faced due to a variety of reasons. Whether it is the misuse of its natural resources such as natural gas, gold, etc, or its leverage in the federal power structure, the scorecard is pretty grim. In real terms, the issue of provincial autonomy has only been resolved recently via the 2010 eighteenth amendment. But even that seems to fit the clichéd description of being “too little and too late” given how the Baloch nationalists view it. (more…)

The third Karachi Literature Festival concluded recently. I am posting a short piece of mine which was published by the News on Sunday. Another report that I wrote for TFT can be found here. Faiza S Khan’s review is most interesting. Another review by Umair found it sterile and comments on the technocratic discussions that took place on ‘national’ issues. And a comprehensive round up at DAWN’s Books & Authors magazine here.

“When our lives are written about in the English language, the books become best sellers,” thundered Pakistan’s rebel poet Kishwar Naheed at the Karachi Literature Festival. This was a session where I had the rather undeserved honour of introducing and talking to Naheed and the other master poet, Iftikhar Arif. She added that there was little emphasis on quality as the books you were supposed to buy at the airports for light reading were now ‘high’ literature. This was an oblique, yet unambiguous reference to the Pakistani writing in English. The two worlds — “native” and English — remain quite separate in a manner that Kipling had envisioned. English writing from Pakistan has received global attention and is celebrated at festivals across the globe. Yet how many Pakistanis have an idea of what it is all about? This is an uncomfortable question that we need to ask and perhaps keep on asking.

The Karachi Literature Festival has now evolved into a serious annual festival where writers gather and interact with thousands of readers each year. To be fair to the organisers, they have been mindful of the principle of inclusiveness from the very start. Asif Farrukhi, an eminent writer (who is my actual role model for his supernatural powers to write, edit and think with a full time job) has been organising the “regional” side of the literary ramblings at the festivals. Big names such as Fahmida Riaz and others are given due acknowledgment by holding sessions with them. Yet, the emphasis, for obvious reasons, is on the universe of English writings — both by Pakistanis and foreigners. This year, Vikram Seth, William Dalrymple, Hanif Kureishi, Shobha De, Anatol Lieven and several others attracted much attention by their readers, fans and critics. There were a few sessions on Urdu and regional languages’ literature but it was obvious that the attendees were not always the same.

As a young woman confessed at the festival, “I hardly read Urdu, but do you consider Initizar Husain a great writer?” Despite the shocking nature of this statement, I was hardly surprised. The apartheid that exists in Pakistan’s education system marginalises the local and the vernacular compared to the more market-oriented, global English. Aside from its potential “benefits,” English language, for some, remains an odious status symbol. A colonial legacy, a preserve of the postcolonial elites, and a stepping-stone for entry into the deliberately constructed, globalised monoculture. (more…)

An old piece that I could not post earlier:

Commenting on the melting state of the economy, a reputed economic analyst stated how the “deplorable state of governance” was responsible for the “mismanagement of public goods”. Luckily, he also reiterated how such accountability was best undertaken through an election. A common misnomer that plagues public discourse relates to how “governance” is viewed as the job of an elected government and that the state and the government are interchangeable entities. It is important to note that the state of Pakistan — post-colonial, encroached and bitten by its non-state offspring — remains the dominant power centre and most elected governments have been at subordinate to these permanent interests.

The most glaring manifestation of this reality came about when the federal government in the memo-case (concerning the alleged treasonous act of authoring a memo addressed to the US against Pakistan’s security establishment) submitted before the Supreme Court that it had no control over the operations of the military and the premier spy agency — the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). This has been said before as well in other judicial proceedings but not so directly. Everyone knew that but the government’s admission makes it clear that ‘constitutional governance’ is but a pipedream in the land of the pure. Without prejudice to any institution, this has been the case for decades and is not going to change overnight.

A new state within the state may have emerged. During the hearing of the same case, an honourbale judge of the Supreme Court remarked in his obiter dicta that the Judiciary was not answerable to anyone but the ‘people’. This statement defies logic as judges are not ‘elected’ by the people; and they are also servants of the state, paid by the taxpayers who are represented by the Parliament. These developments have prompted a beleaguered government and its Prime Minister to announce that Parliament was supreme and that there ‘states within states’ cannot be tolerated.

Leaving aside the torrential decade of 1970s, the evolution of an autonomous power centre within the state apparatus in the form of the intelligence agencies is a well-recognised fact. A martial state since 1950s has been a player in the global power games in the region; and the redirection of state unlike India was almost inevitable. The 2008 elections were, therefore, a transitional moment and during transitions from military to civilian rule, power is shared and not exercised by the elected officials. The addition of another power-centre i.e. the Judiciary is a recent and in its nascent stage of development. Its future course remains unclear whether it can arrest the dominance of the military-intelligence complex. (more…)

 Any morality-led reinterpretation of the supreme law will open doors for future misuse

The federal government seems to have escaped many a crisis in recent months. There is a pattern to this madness. The systemic fault lines of Pakistan’s political system manifest themselves time and again. Whether it is the long-standing civil-military distrust or the fissures within the political elites, this is not a new story. In recent years, the new power centre i.e., higher judiciary has entered the equation thereby creating a new dynamic in terms of power imbalances between various actors. This development has its roots in the events of 2007-2009 when the so-called lawyers movement mobilised urban middle classes and led to what some analysts have termed as the ‘law model’.

Faisal Siddiqui, an active member of the lawyers movement has cited this historic quote in his piece (January 1, 2012,The Dawn) by Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja: “The past three years in the history of Pakistan have been momentous and can be accorded the same historical significance as the events of 1947… and those of 1971 … It is in this backdrop that these petitions have been heard and decided.”

Furthermore, Siddiqui writes how the courts and growing ‘judico-politico’ power articulated the ‘law model’ — negotiating democratic transition through courts and the law — in direct opposition to the ‘force model’ conceived by Musharraf and his associates in the junta. The tensions resulted in the emergence of a ‘consent’ model typified by the NRO and how it allowed for a negotiated democratic transition.

Indeed, this is a new development in Pakistan. The understanding of this law model is rather limited and perhaps rudimentary given that this model is still evolving. Nevertheless, a few conceptual problems can be detected. First of all, it is a well-established principle that democratic development requires an elite consensus of sorts.

The very process of democratisation, as has been noted in various democratic countries entails negotiation, bargain and compromise. Therefore, the consent model is what has driven many countries towards democracy. Several Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia have implemented this model and proceeded with strengthening of civilian institutions.

Needless to say, the political elites and civil society play a major role in effecting this consensus. By signing the charter of democracy, most political parties in Pakistan did agree on a common framework. However, in actual terms the realisation of CoD has been stunted. Even though much of it has been implemented in terms of constitutional reform, the interplay between the parliament, judiciary and the military has been problematic to say the least. (more…)

Pakistan’s military should review the Taliban rule in Afghanistan and how they were not always the kind of partners and proxies we had envisioned

By Raza Rumi

Our Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, has warned the United States that if the accusations against Pakistan continue, the US might lose an ally. This statement comes in the wake of US statements that Pakistan-based Haqqani network has allegedly been involved in recent acts of terrorism in Afghanistan, directly threatening and sabotaging the NATO and US interests.

The US blames the Haqqanis for attacks on the US Embassy and NATO Headquarters in Kabul; for attacks on US troops in Wardak province earlier in September. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen has used unprecedented and strong language against Pakistan’s premier spy agency ISI and the security establishment for nurturing proxies. Pakistan-US relations just as they were about to look better are perhaps today at a nadir in the decade old war on terror.

The US Senate Appropriations Committee has passed a bill which makes all US aid to Pakistan tied to cooperating with the US in fighting “the Haqqani network and other terror groups associated with al Qaeda”. On the Pakistani side, a vast majority of Pakistanis support a confrontational policy and shunning “America’s war”. This emotional position needs a realistic reassessment and Pakistan simply should keep its economic interests above everything.

At the same time, we should reflect as to why the Haqqani Network from North Waziristan has been operating across the Durand Line. Sixty years of policy choices have once again brought us to a critical phase today. The United States and its various policy making arms and bodies have diagnosed the key cause of their failure in Afghanistan as Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, especially the Haqqani network that it protects. This is not the first time that the US has complained and thundered about the ‘double-game’ being played by Pakistan’s security establishment. The problem with such a narrative is that it glosses over the monumental follies of US strategists and war machines. (more…)

Since 1977, military or quasi-military governments have ruled Pakistan. The basic tenet of such a governance structure has been centralization and denial of multiple identities that Pakistanis have. Recent reform via the 18^th Amendment has opened up a debate on new provinces. Not long ago, division of provinces was a taboo. Not anymore. This by itself is a major victory of the quasi-democratic process since 2008, howsoever flawed and contradictory it might be.

Remember this is a country where the largest federating unit – East Pakistan (Bengal) was denied its due in power and resources leading to the tragic events of 1971. From 1955-1970, ethnic, linguistic and local identities were forcibly negated under the One Unit. After the creation of Bangladesh, the federal debate focused on Punjab versus the rest of Pakistan. Even the elected Prime Minsiter, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ordered Army operations in Balochsitan and the North West Frontier Province to quell insurgencies and demands for local autonomy. Zia’s rule (1977-88) was a major setback to the federal project as Sindh was at the receiving end and the smaller provinces were remote-controlled from Islamabad. During the decade of democracy (1988-1999), things improved but only marginally. (more…)

Pakistan needs to undertake research on militancy for effective policymaking

By Raza Rumi:

A recent attempt to understand militancy, “Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan” (Graeme Blair, C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, Jacob N. Shapiro, 2011), provides us fresh insights into the phenomenon or myth of popular support for militant extremism in Pakistan. Using a sample of urban and rural population and employing inventive techniques, this research is an important document if only Pakistan’s policymakers would ever pay attention to the little evidence that is generated with respect to militancy. It is a sad state of affairs that our national policy institutes and ‘think-tanks’ are yet to undertake such studies even when the state and its agencies have been brutally attacked and over 35,000 Pakistanis have died due to terrorism during the last decade. By no means does this survey provide a definitive account of what is happening in the country. However, in the absence of any other study, its findings are most useful to debate how extremism is taking root in the society.

The survey measured public attitudes towards four important militant groups: Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, Kashmiri groups (Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Muhammad among others) and sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the study concludes that the survey participants “were generally negatively inclined toward all four militant organizations” and reinforced what many analysts have said often: “Pakistanis do not have a taste for militants”. However, participants differentiated between the groups. They were more inclined to believe that Kashmiri groups provided public goods like health services, etc., and were much more likely to say that they were fighting for a good cause. Secondly, Pakistanis living in violent parts of the country, e.g. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), strongly disliked these groups probably because they pay a higher price for their actions. (more…)

Karachi needs democratisation of power and robust accountability mechanisms

By Raza Rumi:

Karachi’s mayhem in the past few days has exposed, once again, the primary issue of the megapolis — a weak, encroached state. The city has grown in numbers and is now home to millions of Pakistanis of all varieties. Its cosmopolitanism and centrality to Pakistan’s economy means that Pakistan cannot remain unaffected if its largest city is not functioning well.

July has been a bloody month. However, this is not the first time when the city has been subjected to ethnic-bloodbaths. A week ago, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) walked out of the federal and provincial governments and this was a signal to all and sundry that the tenuous and uneasy peace between the various power-brokers in Karachi would be affected or at the worst torn asunder.

This is precisely what happened. A strike followed the decision and over 100 people were killed in various low-income settlements comprising mohajirs (migrants), Pakhtuns and others. Public transport remained at a standstill and innocent citizens were targeted by death squads of major political parties which mobilise people around ethnic and linguistic identities. The underlying class-divides among major ethnic groups is also an issue to be explored. The biggest city alas is also the most under-researched region of Pakistan. (more…)

Without civil service reform, devolution of policy setting will be unachievable and the current reform may just not achieve its intended purposes

On July 1, 2011, the third phase of redistribution of federal powers and functions was completed whereby 7 federal ministries now stand devolved. These include Ministries of Health, Food and Agriculture, Labour and Manpower, Environment, Women Development, Sports and Minorities affairs. Earlier, ten ministries were devolved to the provinces with the abolition of concurrent list under the 18th Amendment.

Implementing the 18th Amendment: The process has been fraught with political bickering between the Centre and the Provinces and resistance by powerful groups, which are beneficiaries of a centralised Pakistan. However, these political and administrative contests have not undermined the process of devolution. A major factor in negotiating this transition has been the role of Mian Raza Rabbani who heads the Implementation Commission for the 18th Amendment to the Constitution.

Most significantly, the political parties have shown their willingness to work together in achieving the intended results of provincial autonomy related clauses. Having said that, the real test of the elected civilian governments has just begun. Large scale restructuring of the federal government and transfer of new functions to the provinces implies that there is much more needed than executive notifications and political rhetoric.

Beyond executive notifications: Four challenges are of urgent importance. First, to ensure that devolution process is completed and not truncated or manipulated to suit the ends of the political parties. At the same time the regulatory capacity of the state, already weakened over decades, must not be diluted during the transition. Secondly, the corresponding institutional capacities are also devolved to the provinces and where missing, the Centre should advise and facilitate institutional strengthening. Thirdly, a civil service reform is required to achieve the responsive and citizen-oriented governance — the larger goal of the 18th Amendment. Finally, decentralisation of provincial powers is also needed and the local government system should be reintroduced. Unpacking and addressing these four imperatives is now an urgent responsibility, which the federal and provincial governments cannot absolve themselves of. (more…)

It is too early to determine whether Nawaz Sharif is seeking a structural transformation of Pakistan’s governance culture or is merely hankering for acceptability within the power matrix.

By Raza Rumi:

Pakistan’s civil-military imbalance is now embedded in the very nature of the Pakistani state and the way it works. The “idea” of Pakistan has evolved into a wide-ranging and somewhat irreversible militarisation that has penetrated into the society, economy and the very imagination of Pakistan. Prima facie, there is a Constitution at work with civilian institutions that come and go as side characters on the grand political theatre of Pakistan.

However, as they say, societies are dynamic entities and evolve over time. Since the 1971 defeat of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, the trajectory of military supremacy was quite consistent. It is a separate matter that the 1971 moment arrived amid a complete information blackout in the western wing of the country. The West Pakistani newspapers were reporting victory, until the inglorious surrender of General Tikka Khan at today’s Ramna Park in Dhaka on December 16th 1971. Interestingly, the headline printed by daily Dawn on December 17th was: “War till victory”. A small news item below this vain headline read, “Fighting ends in east wing”. The 1970s witnessed the revival of a demoralised and defeated army by none other than populist and pro-poor Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Ideology of militarism: It was Mr. Bhutto who provided the grand ‘ideological’ narrative for the next four decades. Whereas he mobilised people for rights and seeking voice in the manner Pakistan was to be governed, he reinvented the framework for a martial state. First, fighting with India for a thousand years and regaining Kashmir became the plank of state policy. Second, the active pursuit of nuclear prowess became the overarching objective of the security doctrine positioned in relation to the enemy, i.e., India. (more…)

Pakistan: Fixing the civil-military imbalance

By Raza Rumi:

Sovereignty is the flavour of the month in Pakistan. Since the capture and questionable assassination of Osama Bin Laden, the Pakistani discourse has been dominated by endless references to national sovereignty, honour, defence and pride. This jolt to the Pakistani state of mind has come at a time when media is relatively free, a vibrant boundless Internet flashes news by the second and there is quasi-democracy straddling between opportunism of the political elites and tunnel visions of the permanent ruling class: the security establishment.

That the Americans would conduct a surgical strike in the heart of military complex and ‘eliminate’ the poster-boy of Islamism has perturbed the right wing and their patrons who had worked hard for decades to construct a xenophobic, paranoid mindset justifying the country’s military machine. Arguments on incompetence or complicity are lethal for the uber-nationalist narratives; and hence the dilemma, perhaps the greatest of crises for the right wing in Pakistan. (more…)

Us Foriegn Minister

By Raza Rumi:

The killing of Osama bin Laden is another hurdle to tackle, and we are in a critical moment of another reevaluation of the Pakistan-US relations, just a few months after the close of the Raymond Davis saga.

Pakistan-US relations are subject to global scrutiny and elude a definitive assessment due to the nature of a partnership scarred by history, competing interests and unflattering public opinion. Recent surveys such as the BBC World Service Poll indicate that most Westerners perceive Pakistan negatively, while opinion polls, such as the PEW in Pakistan, confirm that the US is neither trusted nor liked by a sizeable majority of its citizens. In this game the media can play the role of a mediator of sorts and allow for the flexibility to overcome the explosive faultlines — both literally and figuratively — between the two countries. (more…)

My piece for The News, Pakistan

As details of Operation Geronimo unfold, more and more questions are being raised regarding Pakistan’s role in the war on terror. Sadly, millions of Pakistanis are even more confused than the global pundits. Other than the lunatic fringe thriving in the folds of mainstream media, ordinary Pakistanis are dumbfounded at the prospect of the world’s most wanted man living next to the deep state’s power-house, i.e., the Pakistan military academy. If bin Laden was indeed residing in a purpose-built house with extra thick walls and security cameras then how come Pakistan’s most ‘efficient’ institution was unaware of this lethal presence? Furthermore, if they were not involved in the operation then how could a mammoth defence establishment allow such a clandestine operation by a foreign country which violated air space and international laws?

Governance crisis: Some of these questions will be answered in due course and some will perhaps turn into eternal conundrums. Perhaps, the most pressing issue then remains, who governs Pakistan and in what manner? Seemingly a constitutional republic, Pakistan’s representative and relatively accountable institutions surely do not steer the ‘national security’ policies. The latter have their own limitations and imperatives of rent-seeking but they are marginal to core policies. Here is the fundamental disconnect and reasons for the flourishing non-transparent culture. (more…)