Ten days after the ghastly attack on the military-run school, Pakistan’s prime minister (PM) finally appeared on national television and announced a set of measures that reflect the civil-military consensus on the country’s counter terrorism strategy. After a national outpouring of grief, anger and global shock in the wake of the […]
The ignoble massacre of children and teachers in Peshawar has led to unprecedented anger and grief across the country. The state has responded by ending the moratorium on the death penalty and convicted terrorists are now being hanged. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has announced that the days of differentiating between the good and the bad Taliban are over. A parliamentarians’ committee is reviewing counterterrorism measures that need to be adopted. The military leadership has undertaken the diplomatic-security initiative to engage with Afghan authorities on potential action that can nab the Taliban leadership based in Afghanistan.
All these measures are important and noteworthy. The ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb is here to stay and perhaps, is likely to be extended to other areas. But the central question is, whether these tactical moves are sufficient to tackle the hydra-headed Frankenstein’s monsters that Pakistan’s flawed national security policy has created, sustained and nurtured, sometimes with outside support and on occasions totally on its own. There is a name for this Frankenstein’s monster and it is known as jihad — a narrow, self-seeking interpretation of an otherwise lofty and ethereal religious concept. The struggle embedded in jihad — according to most scholars and not semi-literate clerics — is self-improvement. Instead, this has turned into a spectator sport where private militias carry out state objectives in the region and within the land of the pure.
This trajectory is an old one. It did not happen overnight nor was it a ploy of the Unites States and other powers to get Pakistan into a royal mess. In 1948, ‘jihadis’ from the tribal regions started with the battle of Kashmir that continues to date. Conventional wars or private ‘jihad’ efforts have brought neither glory to Pakistan nor relief for the Kashmiris, most of whom are sick of India and Pakistan treating their land and rights as national fiefs. […]
Pakistan’s predicament is a sad tale of domestic Islamist identity enmeshed with the regional dynamics.
The latest strike by the Pakistani branch of the Taliban movement has jolted the globe. It was not the first attack on civilians. Earlier, Pakistani markets, religious processions and Hazara settlements have been targeted, killings hundreds. But the barbarity of targeting children – killing 132 innocent students – has swung the public opinion in Pakistan. Pakistan’s military has been fighting the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for the past few years. Since June this year, it launched a major offensive in North Waziristan region, claiming to have killed more than 1,000 militants and reclaiming nearly 80 per cent of the territory that they were holding. For the TTP to strike at an army-run school, killing 132 children and nine school staff, indicates that the network is far from being eliminated. Military sources think that this was an act of desperation on the part of the Taliban. Others view this as the ability of TTP to regroup and find softer targets.
The prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, in the wake of these attacks, called an emergency all-party conference where he vowed to fight terrorism, once again. The moratorium on death penalty has been lifted; because of it hundreds of convicted militants had not been punished. Human rights’ campaigners doubt it will work but there is widespread public support for hanging the terrorists. The second important decision announced by the PM is that Pakistan no longer distinguishes between the “good” (those who don’t attack Pakistan and are focused on Afghanistan) and the “bad” (anti-Pakistan) Taliban.
This is a crucial announcement even if its translation into policy is unclear and perhaps unachievable. Pakistan’s strategic view of the region is based on the threat perception from India and an Afghanistan that may allow Indian influence to grow on its western border. This is well documented in the defence literature and also articulated by strategic thinkers all the time. Will this worldview be revised or adjusted is something that remains to be seen.
Essentially, the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban share the same ideology and tactics and they have supported each other in the past. In fact, the emergence of the TTP shows the “strategic depth” doctrine has backfired. […]
Pakistan faces a challenge largely of its own creation and only political processes can correct it, argues Raza Rumi.
The attack on Peshawar’s Army Public School and the killing of more than 130 children creates a new watershed in Pakistan’s battle against terrorism.
Maligned globally as a ‘hub’ of terror, Pakistan has suffered immensely in the past decade. More than 50,000 of its civilians have been killed and over 15,000 security personnel have laid down their lives.
Pakistan’s policy choices of the past have been far from sagacious and its purported self confessed identity as an Islamic State has not helped matters. More than that it is the curse of geography that has haunted the nation.
For 30 years, it has been an active participant in Afghan wars directly and indirectly and the perceived threat from the larger neighbour India is almost an article of faith.
December 16 also marks the anniversary of the humiliation that Pakistan suffered when in 1971 East Pakistan with India’s support became independent.
In 1947 the country’s founder called the country he created s ‘moth eaten’ and ‘truncated’ and since 1971 the insecurity has only grown.
How far is that an imagined construct, how much of it is to continue to run it as a martial State has been subject of unresolved debate — yet to be resolved.
The Afghan policy of the 1980s and patronage to the Taliban movement in the 1990s is part of that insecure worldview. National security has been defined in limited terms and the reliance on non State actors to work as support system for the formal security apparatus remains a policy tenet. Yet there are signs of change.
One such shift was the decisive operation against the militants launched in June. Thus far the operation was cited as successful with the regaining of territory and eliminating militant hideouts. […]